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PENNSYLVANIA v. NELSON: A CASE STUDY
IN FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION*
ROGER C. CRAMTONt
N TEE CELEBRATED CASE of Pennsylvania v. Nelson' the Supreme Court,
drawing on the metaphorical tests for "occupation of the field" developed
in commerce clause cases, held that federal legislation regulating
communist activity had superseded the Pennsylvania Sedition Act.2 The con-
tinning agitation regarding the decision has been largely provoked by its con-
siderable impact on the power of the states to legislate with respect to issues of
subversion and loyalty. The Court's decision invalidated the sedition statutes of
forty-two states3 and, in addition, raised serious doubt as to the validity of other
state measures in this field.4 It is not surprising that such a striking displacement
of state authority has generated much critical comment and has given rise to
rash proposals for congressional reversal.5 At the same time, however, the con-
* An earlier draft of this article was prepared as a basis of discussion at a seminar to have
been attended by a committee of the Conference of Chief Justices and members of the faculty
of the University of Chicago Law School.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1350 U.S. 497 (1956).
2Pa. Penal Code §207, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1945) §4207.
' For a summary and description of the state sedition statutes existing as of January 1955,
see Fund for the Republic, Digest of the Public Record of Communism in the United States
266-306 (1955) (hereafter cited as "Digest").
4 See note 97 infra. For an excellent and comprehensive study of the social and legal implica-
tions of the national preoccupation with the loyalty of citizens, see Brown, Loyalty and Se-
curity (1958). The state legislation as of 1955 is summarized and described in plentiful detail in
Digest, op. cit. supra note 3, at 241-488. The history in a number of states is traced in Gellhorn,
The States and Subversion (1952).
5 The proposals have been of two kinds. Most of the proposed bills would reverse the Nelson
case by providing that the various federal communist control measures "shall not prevent the
enforcement in the courts of any State of any statute of such State prescribing any criminal
penalty for ... sedition against such State or the United States ...." See, e.g., Sen. 2,646,
85th Cong. 2d Sess. (1958), which failed of enactment by a close Senate vote. 104 Cong. Rec.
17,788 (1958). A statute of this type presents a constitutional question only if sedition against
the United States is within the exclusive powers of the federal government. The present writer's
view is that legislative reversal of the Nelson case, whatever one's view of the Court's use in
that case of pre-emption doctrine, would be unwise as a policy matter.
A more drastic type of proposal would establish a general rule of construction against super-
session of state laws. See, e.g., Sen. 3,143, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. (1956). The Department of jus-
tice has consistently opposed any broad enactment on the unassailable ground that unforeseen
effects on numerous federal programs might result. For an analysis of the problems raised by
measures of this broader kind, see Wham and Merrill, Federal Preemption: How To Protect
the States' jurisdiction, 43 A.B.A. J. 131 (1957).
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centration of attention on the effect of the decision and on the merit of the
various legislative proposals it has engendered has resulted in a lamentably di-
minished discussion of other noteworthy aspects of the case.
The Nelson case is apparently the first case in which the Supreme Court has
held that a federal criminal statute, not involving a regulatory scheme under the
Commerce Clause, supersedes, in the absence of conflicting provisions, the en-
forceability of a concurrent state criminal statute.' The application of tests de-
veloped in commerce clause cases to sedition legislation based on the federal war
powers itself marks a significant extension of pre-emption doctrine. And finally,
the Court's frequent use in recent years of the pre-emption doctrine to effect
broad displacements of state authority reopens the more important question of
the soundness of the pre-emption doctrine as it has been developed by the
Court.7 This article will consider the content and meaning of the Supreme
Court's application of pre-emption doctrine in the Nelson case, and, on the basis
of this examination, attempt an evaluation of the doctrine. However, before
turning to the Nelson case, a brief resum6 of the doctrine of supersession and of
the conclusions hereafter advanced will assist in placing the matter in perspec-
tive.
The question of federal supersession of state legislation only arises when
Congress, exercising a power not within the exclusive competence of the federal
government, has dealt in a constitutional fashion with the same conduct or legal
relations which is the concern of the otherwise valid state legislation brought in-
to question. Under traditional doctrine, the question is phrased in terms of
whether, under the Supremacy Clause of Article VI, existing federal legislation
has "occupied the field" to the exclusion of concurrent state legislation. The
answer is said to turn on the intent of Congress. Since in any case likely to reach
a court Congress has remained silent with respect to the displacement of state
law, the courts are left to solve the problem with few if any guides. Ultimately,
6But cf. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 22-23 (1820) (invalidating state statute but
sustaining state court martial conviction for militiaman's federal offense); Prigg v. Pennsyl-
vania, 16 Pet. (U.S.) 539, 617-618, 636 (1842) (invalidating state criminal statute interfering
with constitutionally guaranteed right of slave owner to recapture his fugitive slave); Matter of
Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 506-8 (1905) (invalidating federal law which subjected Indian allottees to
both federal and state liquor statutes). These cases, each of which contains strong statements
in support of the view that enactment of a federal criminal statute automatically supersedes a
concurrent state criminal statute, are unsatisfactory as precedents because (1) each was ulti-
mately decided on another ground, and (2) subsequent decisions have ignored them or rejected
the dicta contained in them. In re Heff was explicitly overruled by United States v. Nice, 241
U.S. 591 (1916).
7The Supreme Court's doctrine of pre-emption, particularly as applied in commerce clause
cases, is discussed in Dunham, Congress, The States and Commerce, 8 U. of Chi. L. S. Rec.
54 (Supp., 1958); "Occupation in the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-1946: Ten
Years of Federalism, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 262 (1946); Supersedure of State Laws by Federal
Regulations under the Commerce Clause, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 532 (1938). See also Braden,
Umpire to the Federal System, 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 27 (1942), and Sholley, The Negative
Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 556 (1936).
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the Supreme Court must supply or presume an intent from whatever available
materials it deems proper.
The purposes, scope and content of concurrent state and federal legislation
are of such vast variety, and situations of concurrence so large in number, that a
simple solution to pre-emption problems should not be expected. No abstract
formula can resolve complicated problems of federalism. Nevertheless, the con-
fusion of the cases, even bearing in mind that no two pre-emption cases present
the same problem, is striking. Various "tests" of supersession are stated in the
cases, singly or in combination,8 and the choice of a particular test or tests may
be more decisive than its application to particular facts. On some occasions only
one test is viewed as controlling and others are ignored;9 in other cases several
are examined.10 Nor is the content of any test much clearer. What is "conflict"
in one case is characterized as "coincidence" in another; a "field" that is narrow
here is broad there; and so on. Today as well as thirty-five years ago, it seems
true that "[t]he court has drawn its lines where it has drawn them because it has
thought it wise to draw them there."1 It is no wonder that lawyers and judges
who think that the law is discoverable and that continuity and certainty are
indispensable have criticized the Court's handling of pre-emption problems.
If the "tests of supersession" which are inconsistently applied by the Court
are themselves lacking in definition or priority, what is the touchstone of deci-
sion? The thesis of this article is that the use or non-use of particular tests, as
well as their content, is influenced more by judicial reaction to the desirability of
the state legislation brought into question than by the metaphorical sign-lan-
guage of "occupation of the field." And it would seem that this is largely un-
avoidable. The Court, in order to determine an unexpressed congressional in-
tent, has undertaken the task of making the independent judgment of social
8 Among the more common "tests" are the following: (1) The Conflict Test-"... in the
application of this principle of supremacy of an act of Congress in a case where the State law
is but the exercise of a reserved power, the repugnance or conflict should be direct and positive,
so that the two acts could not be reconciled or consistently stand together.... ." Sinnot v.
Davenport, 22 How. (U.S.) 227, 243 (1859). (2) The Coincidence Test-"When Congress has
taken the particular subject-matter in hand coincidence is as ineffective as opposition.. .."
Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). (3) The
Dominance Test-". .. the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). (4) The Perns-
siveness Test-"The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Ibid. (5) The Conflict in
Administration Test.-"... enforcement of [the state law] presents a serious danger of conflict
with the administration of the federal program." Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505
(1956).
9 The conflict test is often stated as the exclusive test when state regulation is upheld. E.g.,
Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441 (1937).
"0 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331
U.S. 218 (1947).
11 Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the Commerce Clause and State Police Power,
1910-1914 ]a, 22 Col. L. Rev. 28, 48 (1922).
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values that Congress has failed to make. In making this determination, the
Court's evaluation of the desirability of overlapping regulatory schemes or
overlapping criminal sanctions cannot but be a substantial factor.
Tan NELSON CASE
Pennsylvania v. Nelson"' was a state sedition prosecution. Nelson, an ad-
mitted member of the Communist Party, was convicted in a Pennsylvania state
court for knowingly advocating the overthrow, by force or violence, of the gov-
ernments of the United States and of Pennsylvania. 3 The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, finding that the case involved only sedition against the United
States, reversed the conviction, holding that the Smith Act of 1940 had super-
seded the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act.14 The United States
Supreme Court affirmed.'"
The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held that the federal
statutes dealing with national security, particularly the Smith Act of 1940,1" the
Internal Security Act of 195017 and the Communist Control Act of 1954,18 "oc-
cupied the field" because each of several "tests of supersession" had been met.
(1) "The scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it."" (2)
"[T]he federal interest is so dominant that the federal system [must] be assumed
to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject."" And (3) the
"danger of conflict with the administration of the federal program [is] serious.""
The scheme of federal regulation was thought "pervasive" because the Smith
Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954
in the "aggregate" made "inescapable" a conclusion that "Congress has in-
tended to occupy the field of sedition."2 The dominance of the federal interest
was evidenced by the "all-embracing program for resistance to the various
forms of totalitarian aggression" devised by Congress," including the proscrip-
tion of sedition against local and state governments as well as against the nation.
The congressional finding that communist sedition was "part of a world con-
" 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
13 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 172 Pa.Super. 125, 92 A.2d 431 (1952).
14 Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 104 A.2d 133 (1954).
Is350 U.S. 497 (1956). Justices Reed, Burton and Minton dissented, in an opinion written
by Mr. justice Reed.
1654 Stat. 670, 671 (1940), 18 U.S.C.A. §2385 (1952).
17 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified, as amended, in scattered sections of Title 8, 18, 22, 50
U.S.C.A.).
18 68 Stat. 775 (1954) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 50 U.S.C.A.).
19350 U.S. 497,502 (1955), quoting from Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230
(1947).
20 Id., at 504. 2 Id., at 504.
21 Id., at 505. 23 Ibid.
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spiracy" indicated that sedition against the United States was a national, rather
than a local, offense. The "serious" danger of conflict with federal administra-
tion was based on statements of federal officials requesting local law enforce-
ment officers to turn over to the F.B.I. all information relating to subversive ac-
tivities; on the lack of uniformity and safeguards of the various state sedition
laws; and on the peculiar feature of the Pennsylvania statute permitting actions
to be brought on private information alone.
Finally, the Court indicated that the possibility of double punishment was a
factor in its decision: "Without compelling indication to the contrary, we will
not assume that Congress intended to permit the possibility of double punish-
ment."
24
AmIGUITY OF TE TESTS APPLIED BY TE COURT
The Nelson case builds on and exemplifies the deficiencies of the Supreme
Court's law of pre-emption.25 The Court drew three "tests of supersession" from
the available armory and undertook, with their guidance, to discover the intent
of Congress. Although these tests-the dominance of the federal interest, the
pervasiveness of the federal scheme and the possible conflict in administration-
represent relevant considerations, their content here as elsewhere is undefined,
and their application fails to provide a confident answer to the question to which
they were supposedly directed-the intent of Congress.
1. Dominance of the Federal Interest.-The Court's assertion that communist
sedition is a matter of paramount interest to the federal government must be
readily accepted. The Constitution empowers Congress to "provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States," provides war
powers of sweeping nature,27 and charges the federal government with the duty
of "guarantee[ing] to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment."2 8 Whatever may have been the localized impact of street-corner anarch-
ist speeches, the modern problem of subversion by a tightly-organized con-
spiracy is a national problem calling for a national solution. But to concede this
is not to solve the pre-emption problem.
The Court assumed that whenever Congress legislates in a field in which the
federal interest is dominant, it intends to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject. If congressional intent is really to be controlling, the assump-
tion seems fallacious. Why should it be assumed that state legislation embodying
the same purpose and prohibiting the same activity is thereby invalidated? Is it
not as reasonable to assume that Congress contemplated the cooperation of the
states against the common enemy? 9 Either assumption-that of preclusion or
24Id., at 509-510.
2Consult materials cited note 7 supra. 27 U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8, clauses 11-14.
26 U.S. Const. Art. 1, §8. 28 U.S. Const. Art. 4, §4.
29 See Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 328-331 (1920).
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that of cooperation-appears equally reasonable (or equally unreasonable) in
the absence of any other evidence of congressional intent. And what little evi-
dence there is supports an inference of cooperation rather than preclusion: Con-
gress was aware of the widespread existence of state legislation prohibiting sedi-
tion; its own statute was largely copied from one of the older state statutes;30
and Congress did nothing expressly to preclude the continued operation of these
state statutes.
Moreover, it is not enough to say that the federal interest is dominant. The
interest of the states in self-preservation and in preservation of the Union must
also be considered. State legislation based on these interests, proscribing treason,
sedition, espionage and similar offenses, is old. Overlapping federal legislation on
these matters has existed at various times, and contentions that the federal
legislation pre-empted the field have been rejected whenever made."'
Gilbert v. Minnesota2 was the leading case prior to Nelson. Gilbert had been
prosecuted and convicted in a state court for interfering with military enlist-
ment during World War I, conduct which was also proscribed by the Federal
Espionage Act.33 The Court, in affirming the conviction, emphasized the co-
operative nature of the federal system and the interest of the states in assisting
the federal government in preserving the whole. The Court's opinion went on to
say that the state statute was justified as a local police power measure designed
to prevent breaches of the peace. In the Nelson case, Gilbert was treated as rest-
ing solely on the narrower police power ground.3 4 Limiting Gilbert to its narrow-
est holding, clearly not the intended one,35 reduces the case to insignificance.
Instead, the Court in Nelson relied on Hines v. Davidowitz,3 6 in which the
30 Brief amici curiae of the United States at 25, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
31 Barton v. City of Bessemer, 234 Ala. 20, 173 So. 626 (1937); People v. Steelik, 187 Cal.
361, 203 Pac. 78 (1921); State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18,46 AtI. 409 (1900); People v. Lloyd, 304
Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922); State v. Holm, 139 Minn. 267, 166 N.W. 181 (1918); State v.
Kahn, 56 Mont. 108, 182 Pac. 107 (1919); State v. Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 269, 106 Atl. 145 (1919);
appeal dismissed 254 U.S. 662 (1920); People v. Most, 171 N.Y. 423, 64 N.E. 175 (1902);
Commonwealth v. Lazar, 103 Pa. Super. 417, 157 Ati. 701 (1931); State v. Hennessy, 114
Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211 (1921).
-254 U.S. 325 (1920). 3340 Stat. 219 (1917), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §2388 (1951).
34 350 U.S. 497, 501 (1956). Gilbert had spoken at a public meeting. His remarks were re-
sented and a threat of disorder was thought to be presented. But cf. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353 (1937).
35 That a broader ruling was intended is shown by the Court's reliance on the Gilbert case in
dismissing the appeal in Tachin v. New Jersey, 254 U.S. 662 (1920). The defendants in that
case had been convicted of sedition for asserting that the United States had entered World War
I for the benefit of certain capitalistic interests. The state court held that the state could punish
the acts under its own law even though the offense was directed solely against the United
States. "Primarily sedition against the United States is a crime against the federal government,
which is the direct subject of attack; but under our system the federal and state governments
are so closely interwoven that an attack on the former may imperil the existence of the latter."
State v. Tachin, 92 N.J.L. 269, 271-72, 106 Atl. 145, 147 (1918).
36312 U.S. 52 (1941).
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Federal Alien Registration Act of 194037 was held to supersede a Pennsylvania
alien registration statute. The common feature of the two cases is that both in-
volve matters of vital federal interest. But there the resemblance ceases. The
state regulation involved in the Davidowitz case required aliens to carry an
identification card at all times, a burdensome feature which Congress had re-
jected. Moreover, the Court felt that the existence of dual regulation would have
repercussions on United States foreign policy, a matter within the exclusive
power of the federal government. Finally, overlapping regulation was involved
in the Davidowitz case, rather than concurrent criminal statutes as in the Nelson
case, and, as will be seen, this factor is of some significance.
2. Pervasiveness of the Federal Scheme.-It is true that the Smith Act, the
Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of 1954 add up
to a tidy bit of legislation. But it does not follow from the fact that Congress
enacted three major communist control measures in the space of fifteen years
that Congress "intended to occupy the field of sedition."
It should be noted first that only one of these statutes deals with sedition.
The Smith Act,39 the only federal statute dealing directly with sedition, is a
criminal statute pure and simple, prohibiting certain defined conduct. It pro-
scribes among other things the advocacy of the overthrow of federal or state
governments by force or violence. The Internal Security Act of 1950 and the
Communist Control Act of 1954 have more of a regulatory character. The
former requires the registration of "Communist-action organizations" and
"Communist-front organizations; '39 the latter declares "that the Communist
Party ... is in fact an instrumentality of a conspiracy to overthrow the Gov-
ernment of the United States"40 and that it is a "Communist-action" organiza-
tion within the meaning of the Internal Security Act of 1950, and provides that
"knowing" members of the Communist Party are "subject to all the provisions
and penalties" of that act.41
Moreover, it is not true that the broad treatment by Congress of any subject
within its power automatically bars supplemental action by the states dealing
with the same subject matter. California v. Zook 42 serves as an extreme illustra-
tion in an area complicated by the negative implications of the Commerce
Clause. A regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 prohibited the sale of "share expense" automobile
passenger transportation in interstate commerce where the transporting carrier
had no permit from the ICC. Despite the broad regulatory character of the fed-
37 54 Stat. 673 (1940), 8 U.S.C.A. §451 et seq. (repealed June 27, 1952).
18 62 Stat. 808 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §2385 (Supp., 1957).
39 64 Stat. 987 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. §781 et seq. (1951).
40 68 Stat. 775 (1954), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. §841 (Supp., 1957).
4168 Stat. 776 (1954), as amended, 50 U.S.C.A. §843 (Supp., 1957).
-336 U.S. 725 (1949).
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eral legislation, the Court affirmed a conviction under a California statute pro-
hibiting conduct identical to that proscribed by the federal act.
An example drawn from another area of federal action may clarify the point.
A complicated set of federal statutes, filling 220 pages of the United States
Code, deals with banks and banking.4 These include comprehensive legislation
covering the organization and regulation of national banks, the Federal Reserve
System-and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, to name only a few. A
related provision of the criminal code proscribes bank robbery and related
crimes involving banks organized, operating, or insured under the laws of the
United States.44 Does the existence of this comprehensive federal legislation
mean that states are without power to punish robberies from such banks which
occur within their jurisdiction? The answer has always been thought to be
otherwise.4
The existence of concurrent state and federal criminl statutes dealing with
sedition can with equal logic support either the inference that Congress intended
to supplement state law or that it intended to replace state law. To label other
federal legislation dealing with national security as a "pervasive scheme of regu-
lation" does not advance this logic, but states a conclusion which must have
been reached on other grounds.
3. Possible Conflict of Administration.-A clear-cut showing that state sedi-
tion prosecutions had interfered with the administration of the Smith Act would
have redeemed the deficiencies of the "dominance" and "pervasiveness" tests.
Unfortunately, despite the considerable period of concurrent legislation, the
Court was unable to adduce any evidence of actual conflict in administration. It
relied instead on the possible danger of administrative conflict in the future
which might result from dual legislation and lack of uniformity in the provisions
of the state statutes.
Statements made during 1939 and 1940 by President Roosevelt and J. Edgar
Hoover requesting the states to turn over any information with respect to sub-
versive activities to the federal government were quoted as supporting a danger
of conflict. As Mr. justice Reed pointed out in the dissent, these statements con-
tained "no suggestion from any official source that state officials should be less
alert to ferret out or punish subversion."46 The views of the Department of
Justice, appearing at the invitation of the Court to state the position of the
United States, to the effect that the state legislation had not impeded federal
enforcement, would appear to be entitled to at least as much weight.
43 12 U.S.C.A. §1-§1831 (1957).
44 62 Stat. 796 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §2113 (Supp., 1958).
45See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943); In re Morgan, 80 F.Supp. 810 (N.D.
Iowa, 1948); People v. Candelaria, 139 Cal.App.2d 432, 294 P.2d 120 (1956); State v. Cioffe,
130 N.J.L. 160, 32 A.2d 79 (1943).
46 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 518 (1956).
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INAPPLICABILITY OF COMmERCE CLAUSE TESTS
Enough has been said to indicate that the Court treated the Nelson case as
though it were a case such as Hines v. DavidoWitz,4 7 in which a state exacted
additional requirements on a matter regulated by Congress. The tests applied in
Nelson were largely drawn from Commerce Clause cases involving a deviation of
state law from the federal pattern, rather than a mere coincidence of state and
federal law. 48 It would seem that the case would more properly have been treated
as one of coincidence of state and federal criminal statutes.
The common feature of the Smith Act of 1940, the Internal Security Act of
1950 and the Communist Control Act of 1954 is that each is concerned with
national security. But, as pointed out above, the Smith Act is the only federal
criminal statute dealing directly with sedition. Although the Internal Security
Act contained new criminal provisions proscribing conspiracy to establish a to-
talitarian dictatorship and communication or receipt of classified information, 49
its major concern is the elaborate registration scheme for communist organiza-
tions.50 The criminal penalties for failure to register5' are incidental to the regu-
latory scheme. The Communist Control Act expanded the registration scheme
to include "Communist-infiltrated" organizations and extended the require-
ments of the Internal Security Act to knowing members of the Communist
Party 2
Although these statutes are interrelated, only the registration and related
provisions of the Internal Security Act and the Communist Control Act would
seem to constitute a comprehensive regulatory scheme of the type that has been
thought to require a pre-emptive intent. The question in the Nelson case was not
whether state statutes requiring registration of communist organizations and
members had been superseded, but only whether state sedition prosecutions
were precluded. 3 The case before the Court involved only the coincidence of
47312 U.S. 52 (1941).
48 Pre-emption cases may be divided into three general classes, each of which has been ac-
corded somewhat different treatment because of the differing policy considerations that are
applicable. (1) Where federal and state statutes are in conflkt in the sense that compliance with
one necessarily constitutes violation of the other. (2) Where a state pattern of regulation
deviates from the federal pattern, without directly conflicting. The state regulation may differ
in that it imposes an additional requirement on the same matter, or in that it closes a gap in the
federal scheme by regulating a closely related matter. (3) Where federal and state statutes
coincide by requiring or forbidding exactly or substantially the same thing. A similar classifica-
tion is suggested in Sholley, Cases on Constitutional Law 946-47 (1951).
For a more detailed discussion of the various kinds of pre-emption cases, and the differing
problems they present, see discussion at pp. 104-7 infra.
4164 Stat. 991 (1950), 50 U.S.C.A. §783 (1951).
50 Id., at 987, 989, 993, 995-98, 1002 and §§781-82, 786-93. '11d., at 1002 and §794.
5 268 Stat. 586, 775-78, 780 (1954), 50 U.S.C.A. §§782, 784, 786, 789-92a, 793, 841-57
(Supp., 1958).
63 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered only the effect of the Smith Act. 377 Pa.
58,104 A.2d 133 (1954). Although the Supreme Court stated that the question for decision was
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state and federal criminal legislation, not differing state and federal regulatory
schemes.
The Pennsylvania Sedition Act and the Smith Act, by very similar language,
attempt to reach the same objectives-the punishment of advocacy of the
violent overthrow of established government. They are criminal statutes pro-
scribing specified conduct and creating substantive crimes independently of any
administrative or statutory regulation. In this respect they are like statutes
punishing murder, robbery, or kidnapping, which are crimes against both state
and nation whenever elements giving rise to both federal and state jurisdiction
are present.54 Although the federal government may have a more vital interest
in punishing sedition, particularly when a world-wide conspiracy is involved, the
states would nevertheless seem to have a legitimate interest not only in self-
preservation but also in the preservation of the Union. 5 Once it is assumed, as
the Court did, that the states have concurrent power with the federal govern-
ment to punish sedition against the federal government, it is difficult to see why
cooperative federalism is a one-way street. Since the federal government through
its criminal statutes may aid the states in the preservation of public order-a
primary responsibility of the states in our tradition-the states would seem to
have an equal right to assist the federal government in the achievement of pri-
marily federal objectives such as the preservation of the Union. In the absence
of any compelling evidence of congressional intent or of a conflict of statutory
provisions, federal unity would be more adequately served by allowing coopera-
tive state action. Thus a pre-emptive intent should not have been inferred in the
Nelson case absent a showing of conflict.
TaE SAVING CLAusE
In a footnote to its opinion56 the Court disposed of an argument, accepted by
the dissent, that the saving clause of the criminal code demonstrated a congres-
sional intent not to supersede state criminal statutes. This saving clause pres-
ently appears as the second sentence of Section 3231 of the criminal code, which
in its entirety reads as follows:
The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of
the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.
whether the Smith Act "supersedes the enforceability of the Pennsylvania Sedition Act which
proscribes the same conduct," 350 U.S. 497, 499 (1956), the Court considered the case as in-
volving the impact of all federal communist control measures on state power, not only the
Smith Act.
54 Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. (U.S.) 410 (1847); United States v. Marigold, 9 How. (U.S.) 560,
569 (1850); Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. (U.S.) 13, 19-20 (1852); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371,
389-91 (1879); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 329-30 (1920); United States v. Lanza, 260
U.S. 377, 382 (1922); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 731 (1949).
5, See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927).
16 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501 n.10 (1956).
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Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the
courts of the several States under the laws thereof.67
The Court said that the saving clause was intended "merely to limit the effect of
the jurisdictional grant of the first sentence" of Section 3231, and was not in-
tended "to resolve particular supersession questions .... "1 The court apparently
viewed the saving clause as affecting only the jurisdiction of the state courts,
but not the impact of federal legislation on state legislation. This construction
of the saving clause does violence to the plain meaning of the words used and is
contrary to its long-established interpretation.
The first sentence of Section 3231, by vesting exclusive jurisdiction of "all
offenses against the laws of the United States," operates to preclude the states
from enforcing federal criminal laws.59 Standing alone, it might also have been
susceptible of the interpretation that state power to punish for any act con-
stituting an offense against the laws of the United States had been superseded.
The Court, in the Nelson case, is apparently saying that the only function of the
saving clause is to negative this possible inference. The language, however, is
much broader: "Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the
jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof." Taken
literally, the saving clause means that the states retain their original powers to
define and punish criminal conduct occurring within their respective jurisdic-
tions, notwithstanding the fact that the same conduct is punishable as an offense
against the United States.
Of course, a general provision of the criminal code, such as the saving clause,
cannot prevent Congress from subsequently enacting legislation which is in-
tended to supersede state legislation. The specific enactment would control
rather than the more general. But the general provision would seem to create a
policy of non-pre-emption which could be overborne only by an actual conflict
of provisions or a clear expression of congressional intent to the contrary.
The history of the two sentences of Section 3231 is instructive. The first sen-
tence of Section 3231, vesting exclusive jurisdiction of federal crimes in the fed-
eral courts, may be traced back to Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,60
which declared that the Circuit Courts of the United States shall have "exclu-
57 62 Stat. 826 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §3231 (1951).
58 350 U.S. 497, 501 n.10 (1956).
59 Without this provision it would not have been certain that state courts could not punish
for federal offenses. See Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 1 (1820) (sustaining state court
martial conviction for militiaman's federal offense; state can prosecute federal offenses when
Congress has not given exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts). See also Tennessee v.
Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880) (sustaining removal of state criminal prosecution of federal revenue
officer to federal court); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (requiring state to entertain war-
time price control treble-damage action even though a "penal" law). See Utilization of State
Courts to Enforce Federal Penal and Criminal Statutes: Development in Judicial Federalism,
60 Harv. L. Rev. 966 (1947).
"11 Stat. 73 (1789).
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sive cognizance of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the
United States, except where this act otherwise provides or the law of the United
States shall otherwise direct." Most of the early federal criminal statutes, by
language almost identical to the present saving clause, did "otherwise direct."
Federal statutes of 1806 and 1807 prohibiting counterfeiting and uttering of
"current coin" of the United States were the first to do so:
[Niothing in this act contained shall be construed to deprive the courts of the indi-
vidual states of jurisdiction under the laws of the several states, over offenses made
punishable by this act.6'
A similar provision was contained in the Federal Crimes Act of 1825, 6 the first
comprehensive federal criminal legislation. With slight changes in phraseology,
the saving clause was incorporated in the Revised Statutes of 1878 and made
applicable to the entire criminal code.6 3 Since 1909 it has been applicable to
what is now Title 18 of the United States Code---the criminal code. 4
Until the 1948 revision of the criminal code, the first sentence of present Sec-
tion 3231, vesting exclusive jurisdiction of fedeal crimes in the federal courts,
and the second sentence, saving to the states jurisdiction "under the laws there-
of," were separate sections. 65 The reviser, as part of the revision of Title 18
combined them to form present Section 3231. The change, of course, was not
intended to make any change in substance.6
The Supreme Court definitively construed the saving clause in Sexton v. Cali-
fornia.6 7 Sexton was convicted in a California state court of extorting money
from another by threatening to accuse him of violating the internal revenue laws
of the United States. The identical conduct was prohibited by a federal criminal
provision. The Court, emphasizing the fact that the federal statute was within
the scope of the saving clause, unanimously held that the conduct was "an
offence both against the State and the United States, punishable in each juris-
diction under its laws." 8 The saving clause was said to "take the case out of
the" exclusive jurisdiction of the criminal code, and its function described as
follows:
The [saving clause] was not intended to merely permit a state court to punish a
different offense involved in the one act. It was intended to leave with the state court,
unimpaired, the same jurisdiction over the act that it would have had if Congress had
not passed an act on the subject.69
612 Stat. 404 (1806); 2 Stat. 423 (1807). 63 Rev. Stat. §5328 (1878).
64 Stat. 122, §26 (1825). 64 35 Stat. 1151 (1909).
5 See reviser's note to 18 U.S.C.A. §3231 (1951).
66 Ibid.
67 189 U.S. 319 (1903). See also State v. Duncan, 221 Ark. 681, 255 S.W.2d 430 (1953)
(fraudulent sale of mortgaged property); Ex parte Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 264 P.2d 513 (1953)
(counterfeiting); Nastasi v. Aderhold, 201 Ga. 237, 39 S.E.2d 403 (1946) (counterfeiting);
People v. Welch, 141 N.Y. 266, 36 N.E. 328 (1894) (manslaughter by officer of vessel).
63 189 U.S. 319, 323 (1903). 69 Id., at 324-25.
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The Smith Act is one of the criminal provisions of the criminal code and is
subject to the general provisions of Section 3231.70 Thus, it seems clear that the
Supreme Court should have held that the saving clause operates to preserve,
after the enactment of the Smith Act, the pre-existing power of the states to
legislate with respect to sedition. Mr. Justice Reed would appear to be correct in
stating that "this one point seems in and of itself decisive... ,7 The Court's
application of the ambiguous tests of supersession becomes more startling when
juxtaposed with its rejection of the mandate expressed in the general saving
clause.
IPORTANCE oF OTHER FACTORs
The Court's opinion itself suggests that the real problem of the case-whether
state sedition prosecutions should be permitted once Congress had actively en-
tered the field-was decided on more pragmatic grounds than are comprehended
in the hazy aphorisms of pre-emption. The opinion manifests a strong distaste
for the state statutes in this field: many "are vague and are almost wholly with-
out... safeguards."72 The Pennsylvania statute in particular was severely criti-
cized: one of its provisions was characterized as "strangely reminiscent of the
Sedition Act of 1798"71 and the fact that it permitted the initiation of a prosecu-
tion by a private individual was seen as presenting "a peculiar danger of inter-
ference with the federal program" and as providing an opportunity " 'for the
indulgence of personal spite and hatred or for furthering some selfish advantage
or ambition .... ,' "74 Finally, and most importantly, the Court gave great
weight to the possibility of double punishment.75
The magnitude of the threat to civil liberty presented by overlapping state
and federal criminal statutes should not be minimized. The possibility that an
individual may be subjected to successive state and federal prosecution for what
would otherwise be regarded as a single crime raises serious questions of policy
if not of constitutional law. Exposing an individual to a second trial when the
first has resulted in an acquittal by a jury contravenes an honored tradition of
Anglo-American society. Likewise, punishing an individual twice for the same
act violates "the principles of the common law, and the genius of our free gov-
ernment."" Concurrent criminal statutes may be the cause of other dilemmas.
The privilege against self-incrimination may be deprived of substance if a wit-
ness in a proceeding in one jurisdiction is compelled to answer questions which
70 54 Stat. 670, 671 (1940); 18 U.S.C.A. §2385 (1951).
71 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 519 (1956).
72 Id., at 508 (1956).
73 Id., at 498 n.2.
74 Id., at 507, quoting Commonwealth v. Nelson, 377 Pa. 58, 74-5, 104 A.2d 133, 141
(1954).
76 Id., at 509-510.
76 Mr. Justice Story in Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 72 (1820) (dissenting opinion).
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incriminate him uncrer the laws of another jurisdiction. The right to be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be abased if evidence illegally
obtained by state officers is utilized in a federal trial.
Despite the impairment of civil liberty, the Supreme Court has held that a
second prosecution or punishment by a different government for the same act
does not violate the Due Process Clause77 or the constitutional provision against
double jeopardy.7 8 Similarly, it has held that the constitutional privileges pro-
tecting against self-incrimination and illegal searches and seizures do not prevent
the use in a federal proceeding of incriminating evidence obtained by testimonial
compulsion from a witness in a state proceeding79 or obtained illegally from him
by state officials.8 0
The possibilities of double punishment and attendant difficulties created by
overlapping state and federal criminal laws are considerations which a legisla-
ture should bear in mind in deciding whether dual legislation is desirable. But
the history and development of federal criminal legislation suggests that ordi-
narily such factors as these should not influence the decision of pre-emption
questions. 8
The early denial of federal common-law criminal jurisdiction 2 placed the pri-
mary responsibility for the maintenance of public order on the states. Prior to
the Civil War the criminal legislation enacted by Congress was confined entirely
to matters of distinctive federal concern: offenses not subject to state jurisdic-
tion (District of Columbia, territories, high seas)83 and offenses directly threat-
ening the existence, integrity or property of the federal government and its insti-
tutions (treason, contempt of court, resistance or obstruction to federal process,
bribery of federal officers, theft of federal property, defrauding of the revenue
and the like)."4 The protection of private individuals from harms committed by
other private individuals, and the use of criminal sanctions to deter and punish
such harms, became a traditional responsibility of the states.
77 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
78 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
79 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
80 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); cf. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310
(1927).
8 1 Useful comments on the general problem of pre-emption when overlapping criminal stat-
utes are involved are: Hunt, Federal Supremacy and State Anti-Subversive Legislation, 53
Mich. L. Rev. 407 (1955); Grant, The Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 Col. L. Rev.
995 (1934); Pre-emption by Federal Criminal Statutes, 55 Col. L. Rev. 83 (1955).
8 United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. (U.S.) 415 (1816); United States v. Hudson &
Goodwin, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 31 (1812). But cf. Crosskey, 2 Politics and the Constitution 764-84
(1953).
83 See Hart and Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1090-95 (1953).
84 See Schwartz, Federal Criminal jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 64 (1948), where the development of federal criminal jurisdiction is traced.
[Vrol. 26
PENNSYLVANIA v. NELSON
When the federal government entered the same field in a major way in the
twentieth century," it did so primarily to aid the states in enforcing their crimi-
nal laws. In some instances (mail fraud, lottery by mail), the use of federal in-
strumentalities was involved, but the connection would appear to be a jurisdic-
tional handle rather than a real connection with any distinctive interest of the
federal government. In some instances (e.g., mail fraud), the lack of any local
incentive to prosecute for harms which have their primary impact elsewhere
seems to have been involved. But the major factors have been either a congres-
sional desire to enlist the powerful forces of the nation to preserve public moral-
ity (lottery, white slave, narcotics) or a desire to aid state enforcement in situa-
tions where it might be frustrated by the inability of state law enforcement
officers of limited territorial authority to cope with the interstate movement of
criminals or stolen property (motor vehicle theft, kidnapping, stolen property).m
The circumstances of enactment, if not express provision, made it clear in
most of these instances that Congress did not intend to displace state criminal
action in these fields. Even when matters of distinctive federal concern, such as
the protection of federal property, were involved, the natural inference was that
Congress intended to supplement state laws and not to displace them. 87 The state
interest in preventing breaches of the peace is involved to the same extent no
matter whose property is taken. State law enforcement officers have provided
protection to federal property from the earliest days of the government. It is in
the interest of the federal government to have them active in the protection of
federal property, for otherwise a more extensive national law enforcement staff
would be required. Possible conflicts in the administration of these dual criminal
laws and the general undesirability of possible double prosecution or double
punishment cannot outweigh the manifest intention of Congress to supplement
existing state criminal legislation. Thus the historical development of federal
criminal legislation and its interstitial character have been thought to preclude
a finding that Congress intended to "occupy the field."88
Other factors have contributed to this conclusion. In many instances Con-
gress has by specific language dealt with the problem, either saving state juris-
85 Several reconstruction era measures anticipated the later development. 14 Stat. 27 (1866),
42 U.S.C.A. §1982 (1957) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); 16 Stat. 144 (1870), 42 U.S.C.A. §1981
(1957) (Civil Rights Act of 1870); 17 Stat. 283, 302, 323 (1872)(Post Office Code of 1872) (mail
fraud, lottery by mail).
86 Cf. Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 84, at 73.
87 United States v. Amy, 24 Fed. Cas. 792, No. 14,445 (C.C. Va., 1859), is the leading case
(dictum of Mr. Chief Justice Taney). See also Quinn v. State, 95 So.2d 273 (Ala.App., 1957);
State v. Moore, 143 Iowa 240, 241-2, 121 N.W. 1052, 1053 (1909); Commonwealth v. Ponzi,
256 Mass. 159, 152 N.E. 307 (1926); In re Van Dyke, 276 Mich. 32, 267 N.W. 778 (1936);
People v. Burke, 161 Mich. 397, 126 N.W. 446 (1910); Ex parte Groom, 87 Mont. 377, 381-2,
287 Pac. 638, 639 (1930); State v. Stevens, 60 Mont. 390, 199 Pac. 256 (1921); Hayner v.
State, 83 Ohio 178, 93 N.E. 900 (1910); State v. Morrow, 40 S.C. 221, 18 S.E. 853 (1893);
State v. Ferree, 88 W.Va. 434, 437, 107 S.E. 126, 127 (1921).
88 Cases cited note 54 supra.
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diction by express provision"9 or preventing dual prosecution.90 And the infer-
ence of pre-emptive intent that might otherwise be drawn from the fear of dual
prosecutions is considerably diluted by the fact that, in practice, such prosecu-
tions are extremely rare.91
The Nelson case is not the first case in which the Court has been influenced
in its decision of pre-emption questions by fear that the existence of overlapping
state and federal criminal legislation would result in deprivation of civil liber-
ties.9 Nor can it be said that under present Supreme Court pre-emption doc-
trine, which requires the Court to make a search for congressional intent that is
almost invariably illusory, this is an irrelevant consideration. But it is question-
able whether a court should undertake such a task. Attempting to ascertain the
intention of Congress on the basis of an assessment of possible deprivations of
civil liberties, which have not occurred and may not occur, involves the weigh-
ing of legislative considerations and the dangers of advisory opinions. It would
seem preferable to adjudicate any constitutional questions as they arise.
The Supreme Court appears about ready to take some action to avoid the
dangers of double prosecution or punishment by a different government for the
same act. There have been intimations in recent years that the Court was
unhappy with the doctrine of the Lanza case93 and might be willing to overrule
it or distinguish it as involving a special Eighteenth Amendment problem. The
Court has recently heard argument in two cases reopening the issue which
Lanza had appeared to settle: whether a second prosecution or punishment by a
different government for the same act violates the Due Process Clause or the
constitutional provision against double jeopardy. In Bartkus v. Illinois,94 the
89 See discussion at 94-97 supra.
90 Several federal criminal statutes contain a clause providing that a state conviction or
acquittal shall act as a plea in bar in the federal court. See 62 Stat. 729 (1948), as amended, 18
U.S.C.A. §659 (1950)(embezzlement or theft of baggage from interstate commerce); 62 Stat.
730 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §660 (1950) (embezzlement of funds of interstate carriers); 62 Stat. 794
(1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §1992 (1951)(wrecking of trains); 62 Stat. 797 (1948), as amended, 18
U.S.C.A. §2117 (1951) (breaking into interstate carrier with intent to steal).
9' Cf. Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 84, at 71-3.
"
2Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 1, 31 (1820);
cf. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 740, 752 (1949) (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Burton).
93 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). In Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253
(1937), it was held that the double jeopardy clause barred double prosecution for the same
conduct by the United States and its subordinate government in a territory. In Jerome v.
United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943), possible double punishment was given as a reason for nar-
row construction of a federal criminal statute. In the Nelson case the Court was careful to say
that "we do not reach the question whether double or multiple punishment for the same overt
acts ... has constitutional sanction," citing an article, Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive
Prosecutions, 32 Col. L. Rev. 1309 (1932), which severely criticizes the Lanza rule. 350 U.S.
497, 509 (1956).
94 Bartkus v. Illinois, No. 1, October Term, 1958. See People v. Bartkus, 7 Ill.2d 138, 130
N.E.2d 187 (1955), cert. granted 352 U.S. 907 (1956), affirmed by an equally divided court,
355 U.S. 281 (1958) (Mr. Justice Brennan not participating), judgment vacated and case re-
stored for reargument, 356 U.S. 969 (1958).
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petitioner was convicted of bank robbery in a state court after an acquittal in a
federal court of robbery of the same bank. The elements of the state and federal
offenses, and the interests protected, were the same, aside from the jurisdictional
allegation in the federal case that the bank's funds were federally insured. In
Abbate v. United States,95 the other pending case, a federal conviction for con-
spiracy to destroy communication facilities operated or controlled by the
United States followed a state conviction for conspiracy to injure private prop-
erty. In this case, unlike Bartkus, the interests sought to be protected by the
federal and state laws do not appear to be the same, and it is arguable that the
elements of the two offenses are different.9 In any event, the Court now has
before it the constitutional problems which, one surmises, had an important
influence on the Nelson decision. It seems likely that the Lanza rule will be
overturned and that the states will be forbidden to prosecute a person acquitted
of the same act after a federal trial. If this occurs, the justification for deciding
in favor of pre-emption in the Nelson case disappears to the extent that the
decision was based on a desire to prevent dual prosecution and punishment.
IMPACT oiF Tm NELSON CASE ON OVERLAPPING FEDERAL
AND STATE OFFENSES
The significant effect of the Nelson decision in invalidating state sedition
statutes and other state laws dealing with subversion and loyalty has been fully
treated elsewhere.9 7 It may have an equally significant effect on state criminal
statutes not dealing with subversion or loyalty which duplicate or overlap fed-
eral criminal statutes. For Nelson suggests that there is no state power to punish
concluct which also constitutes a federal offense unless the conduct threatens or
produces a local breach of the peace. This is the necessary implication of the
Court's treatment of Fox v. Ohio98 and Gilbert v. Minnesota,99 distinguishing them
both on the ground that each involved a breach of the peace. Apparently a state
does not "impinge on federal jurisdiction" unless it attempts to punish conduct
not involving violence, disorder, fraud or other conduct having local effects.100
95 Abbate v. United States, No. 7, October Term, 1958. See 247 F.2d 410 (C.A.5th, 1957),
cert. granted 355 U.S. 902 (1957).
9 6 If the state statute expresses a separate and distinct state interest, it is arguable that the
state is free to enforce its own law without regard to federal action. See Fox v. Ohio, 5 How.(U.S.) 410 (1847); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 560-61 (1875) (dissenting opin-
ion); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
17 See Cramton, Supercession and Subversion: Limitations on State Power to Deal with
Issues of Subversion and Loyalty, 8 U. of Chi. L. S. Rec. 24,31-2 (1958); Hunt, State Control
of Sedition: The Smith Act as the Supreme Law of the Land, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 287 (1957);
Supersession of State Sedition Laws by Federal Legislation, 11 U. of Fla. L. Rev. 224 (1958).
98 5 How. (U.S.) 410 (1847).
99 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
100 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 500-501 (1956).
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This distinction might be viewed as resting upon the notion that the police
power of the states is narrowly limited to conduct having such local effects. But
the Court expressly disclaimed this position: "the decision in this case does
not affect the right of States to enforce their sedition laws at times when the
Federal Government has not occupied the field and is not protecting the entire
country from seditious conduct."'' Sedition against the United States thus is
treated as within the police power of the states; Pennsylvania was prohibited
from prosecuting such conduct in the Nelson case only because it was said that
Congress, by the enactment of laws penalizing and regulating seditious activity,
had intended to displace state law.
In Fox v. Ohio0 2 a similar distinction between offenses involving a local breach
of the peace and those not involving such conduct was suggested, albeit under
somewhat false colors. Fox had been convicted in a state court for uttering false
coin, and the Court, in sustaining his conviction, stated that counterfeiting and
uttering of spurious coin were distinct and independent crimes. Counterfeiting
affected a distinctive interest of the federal government-its monopoly over the
coinage of money-whereas utterance of spurious money affected a distinctive
local interest-the protection of the local citizenry from fraud. This distinction
might have made some sense if the utterance of base coin had not also been pro-
hibited by a federal statute. The Court's deliberate blindness to this crucial fact,
relied on by the appellant and stressed by a dissenting judge, merely raised
doubts as to the constitutionality of the federal statute prohibiting utterance.
Three years later, by a unanimous decision in United States v. Marigold,' the
federal statute was upheld and the doubt settled. Ever since, it has been estab-
lished doctrine that both the states and the federal government can punish the
utterance as well as counterfeiting of spurious money.104 In the Nelson case, the
Court relied on Fox, but did not advert to this subsequent history.
The likely effect of the Nelson decision is not to prevent all state prosecutions
for an offense also punishable under federal law, but only to require that some
aspect of local police power be involved. Both state and federal governments can
continue to punish such overlapping offenses as bank robbery,",' assault on a
01Id., at 500.
102 5 How. (U.S.) 410 (1847).
103 9 How. (U.S.) 559 (1850).
'
04 Ex parte Geisler, 50 Fed. 411 (C.C. Tex., 1882); In re Dixon, 41 Cal.2d 756, 264 P.2d.
513 (1953); People v. McDonnell, 80 Cal. 285, 22 Pac. 190 (1889); Nastasi v. Adehold, 201 Ga.
237, 39 S.E.2d 403 (1946); State v. Moore, 6 Ind. 436 (1855); State v. Mix, 15 Mo. 153 (1851).
Prior to Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. (U.S.) 410 (1847), the state courts had uniformly reached the
same conclusion in reliance on the saving clause appended to federal counterfeiting statutes;
See Chess v. State, 1 Blackf. 198 (Ind., 1822); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. 313 (1844),
State v. Antonio, 3 Frev. 562 (S.C., 1816).
105 See cases cited note 45 supra. Cf. People v. Bartkus, 7 Ill.2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 355 U.S. 281 (1958), rehearing granted 356 U.S. 969 (1958),
in which no pre-emption question was suggested.
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federal officer,'0 theft from a post office'07 and the like,0 8 since in each case the
criminal conduct inevitably involves a local breach of the peace.
It is probable, however, that state power to punish other overlapping offenses,
such as interference with federal recruitment,"9 desecration of the United States
flag," 0 impersonation of a federal officer"' and the like, is no longer permissible
absent a showing that a local breach of the peace was involved. In each of the
above instances the state law is auxiliary to federal law enforcement. The states
are seeking to aid the federal government in maintaining respect for federal
institutions. Although there is no logical reason why the police power of a state
should not encompass the furthering of national purposes and unity, these mat-
ters are of distinctive federal interest, and the existence of a federal penalty may
be thought to require a finding of pre-emption.
People v. Von Rosen,"' a recent Illinois case, is the first case subsequent to
Nelson to apply these principles. The defendants, who had published a picture of
a young woman innocent of any clothing other than a large hat, sunglasses, and a
small but appropriately placed piece of cloth resembling the United States flag,
were convicted in a state court for public desecration of the United States flag,
conduct also prohibited by a federal statute. The Illinois Supreme Court, in re-
sponse to the argument that the federal statute had "occupied the field," con-
cluded: "While it might be inferred that Congress has left no room for the
States to punish desecration qua desecration, it cannot be inferred that Congress
intended to prevent the States from prohibiting that which incites or tends to
incite a breach of peace.""' 3 The court therefore interpreted the state statute as
limited to situations where the conduct was likely to produce a breach of peace
within the state. Since there was no evidence in the record tending to show like-
lihood of a breach of the peace, the court reversed the conviction: "[Tihe Il-
linois act cannot be constitutionally applied to these defendants.""' 4
THE PRE-MPOx DocTRw-AN EvALUATION
The foregoing analysis of the Nelson case suggests that the Court erred (1) in
failing to examine critically the applicability of the "tests of supersession"
106 See Brooke v. State, 155 Ala. 78, 46 So. 491 (1908)(assault and battery in post office).
107 Quinn v. State, 95 So.2d 273 (Ala.App., 1957). For cases preceding the Nelson decision,
see cases cited note 87 supra.
'08 Pre-emption arguments based on the Nelson case have been rejected in the following
cases: Geurin v. State, 315 P.2d 965 (Nev., 1957)(narcotics); People v. Knapp, 4 Misc. 2d
449, 157 N.Y.S.2d 820 (Gen.Sess., 1956) (labor extortion); People v. Bianchi, 3 Misc. 2d 696,
155 N.Y.S.2d 703 (Co.Ct., 1956) (excessive motorboat speed).
109 62 Stat. 811 (1948), as amended 18 U.S.C.A. §2387 (1951).
10 36 U.S.C.A. §§173-178 (not a criminal statute).
M 62 Stat. 742 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §912 (1950).
1- 13 11.2d 68, 147 N.E.2d 327 (1958).
113 Id., at 71 and 329. "14 Ibid.
19581
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
drawn from commerce clause cases and (2) in failing to reckon in serious fashion
with the saving clause of 18 U.S.C. §3231."' The discussion thus far has pro-
ceeded entirely on the assumption that the states have concurrent power with
the federal government to prescribe criminal penalties for sedition directed
against the United States. This assumption has been made only because the
Supreme Court decided the case on that basis. It is possible, however, that the
assumption is unwarranted and that the case reaches the right result, although
for the wrong reasons.
The federal war powers are broad and inclusive. It could be argued that they
are exclusive. Surely some of them, such as the declaration of war, the main-
tenance of armed forces and the conduct of war, are responsibilities of the federal
government alone."' And although the states retain the power of self-preserva-
tion to suppress insurrection and repel invasion, the duty of preserving the state
governments rests upon the federal government. It could be questioned whether
the states have any role to play when a seditious attack upon the federal govern-
ment is made. It would seem that just as the states may not punish treason
against the United States,"7 so also the power to punish sedition directed against
the United States is beyond their province." 8 This, at least, is an arguable posi-
tion, which finds some support in history and which results in a tenable distinc-
tion between federal and state spheres of action: State action involving a matter
within the exclusive competence of the federal government, such as national
defense and foreign relations, is justified only insofar as conduct constituting a
local breach of the peace has occurred. This view justifies the result, if not the
rationale, in Nelson and in Hines v. Davidowitz.
The Nelson case, however, has not been given this lengthy treatment merely
to demonstrate that its result is right or wrong. The analysis of the case has sig-
nificant implications for pre-emption doctrine generally. These more general
conclusions are set forth below.
Cases presenting pre-emption problems may be divided into three general
classes, each of which has been accorded somewhat different treatment because
of the differing policy considerations that are applicable. First, in a few cases
federal and state statutes have been found in conflict in the sense that compliance
'5 62 Stat. 826 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. §3231 (1951).
16 U. S. Const. Art. 1, §8, clauses 11-16; Art. 1, §10, clauses 1, 3.
317 In People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 611 (N.Y., 1814), and in Ex parte Quarrier, 2 W.Va. 569
(1866), charges of treason were found improperly laid against a state, where the accused was
deemed to have acted rather against his allegiance to the United States. Professor Hurst in his
study of Treason in the United States, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 395, 806 (1945), states that
"[t]he trials of Thomas Dorr, and of John Brown, for treason by levying war against the states
of Rhode Island and Virginia, respectively, are the only completed treason prosecutions by
state authorities." Id., at 806.
"'s Mr. justice Brandeis argued unsuccessfully in his dissenting opinion in Gilbert v. Minne-
sota, 254 U.S. 325, 334 (1920), that penalties for interference with federal recruitment were
within the exclusive power of the federal government.
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with one necessarily constitutes violation of the other. Southern Ry. Co. v. Reid"9
is one of the infrequent cases of this kind. A North Carolina statute which sub-
jected rail carriers to penalties for failure to transport freight to interstate points
as soon as received was held to conflict with a federal statute forbidding such
transportation until rates had been fixed and published. While it may be difficult
to determine whether a conflict actually exists, where one is found the Suprem-
acy Clause of Article VI controls the result. The state statute must give way.
A second class of cases, involving situations where a state pattern of regula-
tion deviates from the federal pattern without directly conflicting with it, is more
difficult of solution. The state regulation may differ in that it imposes an addi-
tional requirement on the same matter,"' or in that it closes a gap in the federal
scheme by regulating a closely related matter."' In either case a similar problem
arises: Did Congress intend that its regulation should stand alone? In the usual
case congressional intent is unclear, and conflicting inferences may be drawn
from the fact that the regulatory patterns differ from one another. On the one
hand it is possible that congressional failure to embody the deviating provisions
of the state regulation in the federal regulation indicates congressional rejection
of those provisions. This negative inference may be nourished by judicial specu-
lation concerning possible "inconsistency" of the state regulation with the pol-
icy, purpose or administration of the federal statute. On the other hand, the
very difference of the federal and state statutory schemes gives rise to the infer-
ence that the state statute serves a state interest independent from the federal
interest safeguarded by the federal enactment. In a federal system the interests
of both governments should be given recognition if it is possible to do so. This
approach results in the validation of dual regulation.
Although various predictive factors exist, such as the historic pattern of state
or federal regulation of particular matters, the Court has been extremely incon-
sistent in dealing with cases of this second type. The hollow repetition of catch-
words such as "pervasiveness," "dominance," and the like, has merely obscured
the Court's ad hoc fluctuation from the negative inference that deviation is an
inconsistency to the inference that it expresses an independent state interest.
In truth, both factors are almost invariably present. Any difference makes a
119 222 U.S. 424 (1912).
120 E.g., Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202 (1944) (state statute requiring license
of foreign corporations held valid as applied to customhouse brokers licensed under a federal
statute); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)(state alien registration statute requiring
aliens to carry identification cards held superseded by federal registration statute not contain-
ing a similar provision); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501 (1912) (state statute requiring a more
descriptive labelling of a product than was required by Federal Pure Food and Drug Act held
valid).
32 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) (a state inspection system of the
ingredients used in making renovated butter, with power of condemnation, held superseded by
a federal statute authorizing factory inspection and condemnation of unfit products); Kelly v.
Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1 (1937) (state inspection law as applied to motor tugs which were not cov-
ered by federal inspection laws applicable to practically all other vessels held valid).
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difference (even if it be only the narrow one that the regulated party has two
slightly different regulatory schemes to reckon with rather than a uniform
scheme); and the state statute, to the extent that it differs from the federal, al-
ways expresses a peculiar concern of the state.
The third class of cases involves situations where federal and state statutes
coincide by requiring or forbidding exactly or substantially the same thing.
Cases of this type, like deviation cases, are frequent, but unlike deviation cases a
large number of them involve criminal sanctions. Federal and state penalties
dealing with share-expense automobile transportation, 2 transportation of dis-
eased cattle,'123 and robbery of national banks24 illustrate the variety of cases of
this kind. Whatever the subject matter, however, the significant characteristic
is that the same purpose underlies the respective action of the state and the
federal government. This characteristic makes coincidence cases easier, and at
the same time more difficult, of solution than deviation cases. Because the state
legislation serves no independent purpose of its own it appears to lack jus-
tification, and there is a tendency to infer a pre-emptive intent.Y5 On the other
hand, given the realities of cooperative federalism in regulation and law enforce-
ment, there is a natural inference that each jurisdiction may simultaneously pro-
tect its own interest and reinforce the interest of its governmental partner.
12 6
These contradictory views may be based on different conceptual theories con-
cerning the nature of our federal system. If the state and federal governments
are'viewed as jealous sovereignities contending for power, with the Court in the
position of an arbiter, the burden of overlapping regulation and the resulting
possibilities of friction are likely to be magnified. The result is an inclination to
infer a pre-emptive intent. Particularly is this so if the states have entered a
field which is thought to be one of "predominant" federal interest. On the other
hand, if one views the federal system as a cooperative whole, the fact that Con-
gress, by enforcing the same regulation or proscribing the same conduct, has
thought it wise to aid the states, or the states to aid Congress, is unlikely to in-
duce the inference that Congress intended to displace the state legislation. It is
only fitting that as partners in the same enterprise they should seek to assist one
another toward their common objectives. Overlapping criminal statutes have
long been viewed in this fashion.
2 7
It is obvious from even a moment's reflection that both of these conceptual
patterns contain elements of truth. A degree of competition and strife between
14 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
2 Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346 (1933); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908).
12 Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943).
125 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), and Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
illustrate this tendency.
126 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913);
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
'27 Cases cited note 54 supra.
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the governments of a federal system is inevitable. Yet the entity could not long
survive unless it also brought forth a high degree of cooperation. The incon-
sistent resolution of coincidence questions suggests that the court has not
adopted either one of these generalized views but proceeds in a more particular-
istic fashion. Insofar as congressional intent is unclear (the thesis here is that this
would be the normal case) and precedent does not control the result (as it does
with much overlapping criminal legislation), decision seems to turn on a case by
case determination of whether the duplication of legislation is wise. If the burden
placed on persons subject to the dual regulation or exposed to dual punishment
is not outweighed by the positive value the Court sees in legislative duplication,
such as more effective enforcement, the state statute is likely to be struck down.
It should go without saying that subjective considerations with respect to the
desirability of particular kinds of economic regulation or criminal penalties can-
not help but participate in this balancing process.
The most significant problem raised by pre-emption cases is the role which
should be played by the Supreme Court. The thesis of this article is that in the
Nelson case, as in most pre-emption cases, congressional intent is not only un-
clear but unfathomable, and that the "tests of supersession" which the Court
purports to apply do not provide an answer to the question to which they are
supposedly directed-the intent of Congress. The conclusion which is drawn is
that judicial notions concerning the desirability in particular cases of overlap-
ping regulatory schemes or overlapping criminal sanctions are more significant
in determining the results.
The ultimate issue is whether the Supreme Court should exercise this type of
policy judgment. It is worth noting that the alternatives of the Court are ex-
tremely limited-if there is no objective method of determining congressional
intent and if the Court eschews the broader policy judgment of the desirability
of the overlapping legislation, the only alternative is the automatic application
of a conclusive presumption for or against a pre-emptive intent on the part of
Congress. The Court apparently has felt that the exercise of a broader judgment
is the wiser course. No doubt it has been influenced by the reluctance and inabil-
ity of Congress to provide legislative solutions. The close balance of contending
groups in the Congress may operate to foreclose any immediate legislation or to
force a compromise which leaves the displacement of state law deliberately
vague. Congressional performance in the field of labor relations may be of this
character 28 Perhaps it is not unfair for the Court to interpret congressional
silence as an invitation for the Court to provide answers as problems arise. In
other areas, lack of interest in the subject matter or lack of awareness of the
complexity of the problems may explain the failure of Congress to lay down
adequate guides. Even in these situations the Court may be justified in making
the policy judgments which Congress has failed to make. And, this writer feels,
12 See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations,
8 U. of Chi. L. S. Rec. 95 (1958).
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as a policy matter the Court for the most part has exercised its judgment in pre-
emption cases in a wise fashion.
Despite the appeal of the Court's record, it is believed that the exercise of
such functions by the Court is inappropriate. A democratic society should not
commit such important matters to the relatively unencumbered judgment of
nonelected officers. Moreover, the application of a presumption would have the
virtue of forcing legislative concern with problems which no legislature should
be permitted to avoid. If a presumption were to be applied, it seems clear that it
should be a presumption that Congress did not intend to supersede overlapping
state legislation. In a federal system the interests of both the states and the
federal government should be given recognition until they come into collision
with one another. The states cannot remain as independent centers of govern-
mental power if the expression of state policies is foreclosed merely by the enact-
ment of federal legislation dealing with the same or a closely related subject-
matter. A presumption in favor of pre-emption is destructive of state power.
The opposing presumption permits the state to continue as viable units while
leaving Congress free to protect the federal interest when it is threatened by
state legislation.
